CASE COMMENTARIES
CONTRACT—EXCULPATORY LANGUAGE
The Tennessee Supreme Court held the exculpatory language of a
contract between a medical transporting company and a patient to
be unenforceable and, thus, did not bar the patient’s claim. Copeland
v. HealthSouth/Methodist Rehab. Hosp., LP, 565 S.W.3d 260 (Tenn. 2018).

Autumn Bowling
In Copeland v. HealthSouth/Methodist Rehab. Hosp., LP, the Tennessee
Supreme Court re-examined the analysis for determining the validity of
exculpatory language within certain agreements. Tennessee first used
specific factors for determining the enforceability of exculpatory language
in agreements in Olson v. Molzen, 558 S.W.2d 429 (Tenn. 1977), which was
adopted from Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963).
On December 2, 2014, Frederick Copeland (“Copeland”) was
transported from HealthSouth Rehabilitation Hospital North Memphis
(“HealthSouth”) by MedicOne Medical Response Delta Region, Inc.
(“MedicOne”) for an appointment with his orthopedic surgeon after
having knee-replacement surgery. Copeland did not choose to use
MedicOne for his transportation; rather, HealthSouth had contracted with
MedicOne for transportation for all of its patients. A MedicOne driver
took Copeland, in his wheelchair, from Copeland’s room to the hospital’s
entrance, where Copeland then used a walker to walk himself to the
MedicOne van and get in the passenger seat. Next, the MedicOne driver
gave Copeland a two-sided document including an agreement containing
three paragraphs of exculpatory language providing that Copeland would
release MedicOne of liability for any and all claims that would arise or
involve MedicOne’s transportation services.
Copeland signed the agreement before the MedicOne drive took
Copeland to his appointment. Upon entering the van after his doctor
appointment, Copeland fell, was injured, and eventually filed a negligence
suit. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of enforcing the
exculpatory language of the agreement signed by Copeland because the
agreement was not a contract of adhesion and was for transportation
services, not professional service. On appeal, the exculpatory language was
again found to be enforceable based on the court’s finding that the
rendered services classified as transportation. Furthermore, there were no
major public interest concerns surrounding the subject of the agreement.
171
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The Court began its discussion by noting Tennessee’s push-and-pull
between competing public policy concerns—namely, the freedom to
contract with the belief that a party should not be able to escape suit. In
Olson, the Tennessee Supreme Court adopted the Tunkl factors to make
its decision regarding the enforceability of an exculpatory agreement
designed to release the operating doctor of liability prior to surgery. Olson,
558 S.W.2d at 431. The Tunkl factors are used to assess whether an
agreement pertains to public interest: (1) if the business is the type that is
suited for public regulation; (2) if the service of the party pursuing
exculpation is significant to the public; (3) if the party offers herself as
willing to discharge her service for any member of the public who seeks
it; (4) if the party pursuing exculpation has more bargaining power than
the member of the public; (5) if the party pursuing exculpation provides
only a contract of adhesion and no way for members of the public to pay
and receive protection from negligence; and (6) whether the person or
property of the purchaser becomes controlled by the seller and thus at risk
of oversight by the seller’s agents. Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383
P.2d 441, 445-446 (Cal. 1963). Notably, the Tennessee Supreme Court held
the agreement unenforceable despite the existence of prior cases finding
exculpatory agreements enforceable. Olson, 558 S.W.2d at 432. The
distinguishing fact in Olson was that one party was a professional working
in his professional capacity for the public with an increased responsibility
toward the other party. Id.
This distinguishing fact led to uncertainty about how to apply the
Tunkl factors in future cases. In fact, in its Copeland opinion, the Court
examined cases spanning fifteen years that misapplied the factors or
disregarded them altogether in several contexts. The Court found its
decision in Crawford v. Buckner to be particularly important. 839 S.W.2d
754 (Tenn. 1992). Specifically, when the Tennessee Supreme Court
decided that case, the Court held that a landlord-tenant agreement satisfied
all the Tunkl factors and thus, was unenforceable. This decision implied
that the Olson factors were not only limited to professional services but
encouraged the courts to consider other public policy considerations.
However, misapplication of Olson continued throughout Tennessee and
in federal courts. Thus, the Tennessee Supreme Court accepted the
opportunity to address these misapplications in Copeland.
The Court shaped its road to resolution with an overview of
approaches used to evaluate exculpatory agreements and summarized five
common principles: (1) gross negligence, recklessness, and intentional
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wrongdoing cannot be negated by exculpatory agreements for public
policy reasons; (2) the imbalance of bargaining power and public policy
forbids enforcing exculpatory agreements in contract with common
carriers; (3) exculpatory agreements are disfavored although found
enforceable; (4) to be found enforceable, the exculpatory language must
be unequivocal and clear; and (5) exculpatory agreements contrary to
public policy tend to fall on the side of unenforceability. In addition, the
Court noted that the adopted Tunkl factors were the minority approach to
exculpatory agreements. Further, the Court considered that the precedent
established in Tennessee favored the freedom to contract as opposed to
preventing parties from escaping negligence suits. However, the Court
recognized that not all exculpatory agreements should be held valid solely
on precedent.
Following this overview, the Court reasoned an amendment to the test
used to determine the validity of exculpatory agreements was necessary.
The Court held that the new test was to weigh three non-exclusive factors,
while considering the totality of the circumstances of that particular case.
In addition, the Court declared that this test may be used for all
exculpatory agreements, including non-professional service contracts.
The first non-exclusive factor analyzed is the relative bargaining power
of the parties. When considering relative bargaining power, the court
looks at the availability and reasonableness of substitute choices of the
same service. When a party may not have an equitable alternative choice,
a disparity of relative bargaining power may exist. When applied to the
Copeland facts, the Court reasoned that Copeland had no authority or
option to not use MedicOne to transport him to a necessary doctor
appointment. Indeed, HealthSouth contracted with MedicOne for these
services on behalf of its patients, without permission from the patients
who would be subject to using MedicOne’s services. Further, the
exculpatory language was presented in the two-sided document by the
driver, who had no understanding of the implications of Copeland’s
signature, lacked knowledge to explain the contract if Copeland asked
questions, and who expected Copeland would sign the document.
Moreover, if Copeland did not sign the document, he would have been
unable to go to his appointment and receive proper aftercare.
Second, the clarity of the exculpatory language must be examined.
Specifically, the language of exculpatory provisions must clearly express
the meaning of the language and what rights the contracting party would
be relinquishing. The language cannot be so broad as to exempt the
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drafting party from all liability, nor may it be ambiguous. In the present
case, when assessing the clarity of the exculpatory language, the Court
delved into the grammatical syntax, pragmatics, and style of the language
in the document. While the exculpatory language was printed in bold and
all capital letters, the language demonstrated a broad encompassment of
release of liability that could not be enforced. The language did not
specifically mention gross negligence or recklessness, and the Court
posited that the terms “any and all” were ambiguous and did not properly
convey the intended meaning of the provision to Copeland.
The final factor the Court created involves considering the public
policy and public interest concerns surrounding the agreement. Evolving
societal expectations tend to form the basis for public policy, ensuring the
law is consistent with the Constitution and other legislation while
protecting the people from harm. Public interest concerns stem from
those who oblige their services to the public’s benefit—common carriers,
innkeepers, and public utilities. However, public interest may be affected
outside of these foundational services. Thus, the analysis may include any
service whereby an exculpatory provision may conflict with evolving
societal expectations. The Court explained that Copeland presented a clear
public interest concern, given his appointment was a medical necessity and
not merely a recreational activity. The responsibility the MedicOne driver
was entrusted with, indirectly by HealthSouth and directly by Copeland,
heightened the public policy concerns. The Court further reasoned that
had Copeland not signed the agreement in order to avoid releasing liability,
it would have been impractical and unreasonable to expect Copeland to
find transportation on his own while still under HealthSouth’s care as a
patient.
Finally, the Court summarized its examination of the new test and
held, as a matter of law, that the exculpatory language of the agreement
that Copeland signed was unenforceable. Therefore, Copeland’s claim was
not barred. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and
remanded the case to the trial court.
The Court’s decision in Copeland does not necessarily set out a new
evaluation of exculpatory language but rather modernizes and clarifies a
time-tested, older one. As lower courts of Tennessee work to abandon and
replace broken-in tests such as Olson and introduce Copeland into their
wheelhouse, the lower courts may still expect hurdles. Public policy is
amorphous and cannot be whittled down to one court decision. Further,
ambiguous language to one court may not be ambiguous to another.
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Nonetheless, Tennessee courts and practitioners alike must carefully apply
Copeland, along with other precedent, so as to avoid another post-Olson
like forty-two-year long period of confusion. However, this unanimous
decision will allow the Tennessee bar to start off on the same page when
dealing with exculpatory agreements.

ZONING—RELIGIOUS LAND USE &
INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSON’S ACT
The Sixth Circuit held that courts should apply the legitimate
zoning criteria in cases comparing land uses among religious and
nonreligious entities under the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act’s equal protection clause, and courts
should administer this comparison with respect to the regulations
established by local municipalities. Tree of Life Christian Sch. v. City of
Upper Arlington, 905 F.3d 357 (6th Cir. 2018).

David Cantrell
In Tree of Life Christian Sch. v. City of Upper Arlington, the Sixth Circuit
addressed the manner in which courts should apply the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act’s (RLUIPA) equal terms provision,
and whether Tree of Life Christian School (“Tree of Life”) established a
prima facie case under the equal terms provision of the statute. Importantly,
the equal terms provision of RLUIPA prevents governments from
“imposing or implementing a land use regulation in a manner that treats a
religious assembly or institution on less than equal terms with a
nonreligious assembly or institution.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1) (2000).
However, Congress did not provide the courts with any guidance on the
meaning of “equal” in this comparison. After analyzing various methods
of comparison adopted by other courts, the Sixth Circuit held that the
phrase “legitimate zoning criteria” adequately represents the type of
comparison RLUIPA’s equal protection provision requires, and courts
should administer this equal protection provision with respect to the
legitimate zoning criteria established by the respective local municipal
ordinance.
In 2001, the City of Upper Arlington, Ohio (“City”), adopted a Master
Plan to assist the City’s decisions regarding zoning. The Master Plan
highlighted the City’s goal of revenue maximization via business
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development in the small percentage of land the City allotted for
commercial use, and emphasized the importance of maintaining this
office district for commercial use. In furtherance of the Master Plan, the
City’s Unified Development Ordinance (“Development Ordinance”)
implemented land-use restrictions specifically for the City’s office district
zones, as the City intended those districts to “provide job opportunities
and services to residents and contribute to the City’s economic stability.”
Specifically, the Development Ordinance permitted the use of the office
district for businesses and research centers; however, the ordinance
prohibited both secular and religious schools in the office district and later
barred daycares as well. Nonetheless, the Board of Zoning and Planning
(“Board”) had the power to grant conditional use to churches and “places
of worship” if the organization received prior approval.
Tree of Life (“School”) is a religious nonprofit organization that
operates a private Christian school on three different campuses in Ohio.
In 2009, the School signed a purchase agreement to buy a 254,000-squarefoot office building (“Property”) in the office district. Before acquiring the
Property, the School filed a conditional-use application with the City which
stated they planned to use the Property “as a church with an included
school.” The Board, however, rejected the School’s application since the
primary use of the Property would be a private school. The School filed
suit against the City in United States District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio, alleging that the Development Ordinance violated the
equal terms provision of RLUIPA by excluding the School and treating
them on less than equal terms than nonreligious institutions.
The School moved for a preliminary injunction based on its equal
protection and RLUIPA equal terms claims, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1),
but the District Court denied the motion and granted the City’s motion
for summary judgment. Subsequently, the School appealed to the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals and concurrently filed its first zoningamendment application. Shortly thereafter, the School filed a second
zoning-amendment application, prompting the Sixth Circuit to remand
the case back to the district court. Again, on remand, the district court
granted summary judgment for the City, holding that because the City
excludes both secular and religious schools from the office district, the
restrictions in place by the City did not violate RLUIPA’s equal terms
provision; the School then filed its second appeal.
Upon reevaluation, the Sixth Circuit held that the District Court erred
in granting summary judgment, determining that there was a genuine
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dispute of material fact. Particularly, the School made unrebutted
allegations that other businesses, specifically daycares and businesses using
partially vacant offices, were located in the office district and were
“similarly situated” to the School regarding their minimal capacity to
generate revenue for the City. The Sixth Circuit once again remanded the
case, and both parties filed cross-motions for final judgment. Thereafter,
the District Court entered final judgment for the City, holding that the
daycares were not similarly situated regarding their minimum capacity to
generate tax revenue for the City. Additionally, the Court held that, when
analyzing RLUIPA equal terms claims, one could not compare the full use
of one institution to the partial use of another. Following the final
judgment, the School filed their third appeal.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit noted that there remained a question of
how RLUIPA’s equal terms provision applied and whether the School
established a prima facie case under the equal terms provision. Ultimately,
the Sixth Circuit agreed with the district court and held that the School
did not establish a prima facie case under RLUIPA’s equal terms provision.
First, the Sixth Circuit adopted the statutory requirements to establish a
prima facie case under RLUIPA’s equal terms provision established by the
Eleventh Circuit in Primera Iglesia Bautista Hispana of Boca Raton, Inc. v.
Broward Cty., requiring evidence that “(1) the plaintiff is a religious
assembly or institution, (2) subject to a land use regulation, that (3) treats
the plaintiff on less than equal terms, compared with (4) a nonreligious
assembly or institution.” 450 F.3d 1295, 1307–08 (11th Cir. 2006).
Next, the Court noted the lack of consensus among the circuits
regarding the issue of what constitutes an adequate or “equal” comparator
under RLUIPA’s equal terms provision. After analyzing various methods
of application of RLUIPA’s equal terms provision adopted by the other
circuits, the Sixth Circuit adopted the majority approach, calling it the
“legitimate zoning criteria.” The Court adopted this approach over others
because, as the District Court found, the phrase “best captures the idea
that the comparison required by RLUIPA’s equal terms provision is to be
conducted with regard to the legitimate zoning criteria set forth in the
municipal ordinance in question.” Additionally, in reference to facially
neutral land-use regulations, the Court adopted the majority approach
“that a comparator for an equal terms claim must be similarly situated with
regard to the regulation at issue.” The Court observed that the policy
behind this approach was clear, and Congress did not intend for RLUIPA
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to require municipalities to provide preferential treatment to religious
institutions.
Furthermore, the Court rejected the School’s argument that, as
comparators, they were similarly situated to daycares and partially used
offices in the district. In making this determination, the Court noted that
the School presented no evidence of any other possible land uses that
would generate less revenue for the City than their current operations.
Further, the Court agreed with the District Court’s analysis that partial use
is not a valid comparator for a city to maximize revenue. A municipality
seeking to maximize revenue must make projections regarding the effects
that particular land use may have on the municipality. As such, the Court
determined that the School may not fault municipalities for “inherent
uncertainties” that arise when the municipality makes projections in good
faith and with the best data available at that time.
Finally, the Court rejected the School’s argument that the initial burden
was on the City to prove that there is no plausible or acceptable use in the
office district that is comparable to the School’s proposed use. Ultimately,
the Court held the School did not establish a prima facie case under
RLUIPA’s equal terms provision because they failed to proffer another
permitted land use that would generate similarly nominal tax revenue for
the City. As such, the School was barred from consolidating their schools
into the office district.
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Thapar disagreed, holding that the
School did make out a prima facie case by showing hospitals and daycares
were permissible uses of the land that generated similar portions of tax
revenue. However, in rebuttal, the majority noted that the School’s expert
limited their analysis to daycares and emphasized the fact that he presented
the daycare idea as a hypothetical, with no evidence of any other
permissible land uses that might generate similar revenue. The majority,
opting instead to rely on the City’s expert—who presented evidence and
calculable data that the School would generate three to seven times less
revenue for the City than a for-profit or nonprofit daycare would—
concluded the City did not establish a prima facie case. According to the
Court, it was better to rely on calculable statistics based on concrete data
than to rely on a hypothetical example that was unlikely to exist.
The Sixth Circuit’s ruling on this case is important for Tennessee
practitioners for several reasons. For example, the ruling creates clearlydefined guidance for courts on the application of RLUIPA’s equal terms
provision, which will also aid practitioners in briefing and in everyday
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practice. In the future, courts will have a strict elemental guide to help
them determine whether a plaintiff has made out a prima facie case under
the RLUIPA’s equal terms provision. Further, courts may use the
“legitimate zoning criteria” to assist their application of the comparators
required by RLUIPA’s equal terms provision. Finally, regarding facially
neutral land-use regulations, courts can apply the “similarly situated”
analysis to determine whether comparable organizations or entities are
similarly situated regarding regulatory issues.

VIOLATIONS OF STATUTORY INJUNCTIONS—
TRANSFERRED BENEFICIARY STATUS
The Supreme Court of Tennessee held that (1) a trial court may
consider the equities of the litigants when a party violates a
statutory injunction and then dies with a divorce action pending,
and that (2) Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-6-306 only grants
petitions for grandparent visitation when there is evidence of
parental opposition to the visitation. Coleman v. Olson, 551 S.W.3d 686
(Tenn. 2018).

Gray Martin
In Coleman v. Olson, the Supreme Court of Tennessee addressed the
question of who should recover life insurance benefits when a party in a
divorce action dies after violating a statutory injunction by transferring
beneficiary status from a spouse to a parent. The Court held that trial
courts are permitted to resolve these matters by looking at the equitable
considerations of both parties and distributing the proceeds appropriately.
The Court also addressed the issue of when a petition for grandparent
visitation is permitted. Upon review of Tennessee Code Annotated
(“TCA”) Section 36-6-306, the Court held that evidence of parental
opposition is required to grant a petition for court-ordered visitation
rights.
Bryan and Jessica Olson had a baby boy in 2008. On July 5, 2012, Ms.
Olson filed for divorce, and a statutory injunction went into effect. The
injunction prohibited the parties from changing the terms of any life
insurance policy that named either party as the beneficiary unless the other
party consented to the change. On July 10, 2012, Ms. Olson was diagnosed
with Stevens-Johnson syndrome and confined to the hospital. Two days
later, Ms. Olson changed the beneficiary of her life insurance policy from
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her husband to her mother, Rose Coleman (“Ms. Coleman”). Ms. Olson
also named the Olsons’ child as the contingent beneficiary of the policy.
Ms. Olson died on July 19, 2012, and Ms. Coleman received approximately
$400,000 as the beneficiary of the policy.
Mr. Olson and Ms. Coleman harbored mutual animosity for one
another, but Mr. Olson believed it was in the best interest of the child to
have a significant relationship with his grandmother. Ms. Coleman,
however, insisted on scheduling visitation through the courts and did not
communicate her desired visitation schedule to Mr. Olson. Mr. Olson was
determined to cooperate and settle the matter outside of the legal system,
despite his distaste for Ms. Coleman.
On February 12, 2013, Ms. Coleman filed a petition for grandparent
visitation of the Olsons’ child in the Montgomery County Circuit Court.
Ms. Coleman argued that, under TCA Section 36-6-306, the child would
be substantially harmed if the relationship with his grandmother were to
end. Mr. Olson asserted that the court-ordered visitation was not
permissible, because he was not opposed to Ms. Coleman having visitation
rights. Additionally, Mr. Olson countersued Ms. Coleman for the money
she had received from being the beneficiary of Ms. Olson’s life insurance
policy. He alleged that Ms. Olson violated the statutory injunction by
secretly making Ms. Coleman her beneficiary—and the child a contingent
beneficiary—after filing for divorce.
The trial court granted Ms. Coleman’s petition for grandparent
visitation, because ending the child’s relationship with Ms. Coleman in the
wake of his mother’s death would result in substantial harm. The court
also noted that the animosity between the parties would make it practically
impossible to create a visitation schedule absent a court order.
Additionally, the trial court denied Mr. Olson’s counterclaim for the life
insurance benefits. Even though Ms. Olson had violated the statutory
injunction, the trial court opined that her reasons were not contemptuous
or defiant because she was acting in the interests of her child, not out of
spite for her husband. Accordingly, the trial court awarded the benefits to
the child and instructed Ms. Coleman to deposit all benefits and repay all
expenditures from the policy into a court registry for the child’s use and
benefit.
Both parties appealed the ruling of the lower court. Mr. Olson filed
two issues on appeal. First, he contended that Ms. Olson violated the
injunction, which should result in the restoration of the status quo. As
such, Mr. Olson argued that he should receive the policy benefits. Second,
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Mr. Olson claimed that the trial court erred when awarding Ms. Coleman
grandparent visitation. Ms. Coleman brought three issues on appeal.
Primarily, she argued that the trial court erred in awarding the policy
proceeds to the child because the child was not a party in the litigation,
and neither party had requested that form of relief. Ms. Coleman’s
remaining two arguments alleged that the trial court erred in finding that
certain expenditures from the insurance proceeds did not benefit the child
and, therefore, erred in ordering the seizure of her savings account to
repay those expenditures into the court registry.
The Court of Appeals applied the reasoning in Aither v. Estate of Aither
to determine who was entitled to the insurance proceeds. 913 A.2d 376
(Vt. 2006). Under Aither, a trial court has the power to consider the equities
of the parties when attempting to remedy a violation of an injunction after
the abatement of a divorce. Id. at 380–81. Using this reasoning, the Court
of Appeals awarded the life insurance benefits to Mr. Olson, because a
look at both parties’ equities showed that Mr. Olson’s finances were
substantially worse than Ms. Coleman’s in the aftermath of Ms. Olson’s
death. The Court of Appeals also reversed Ms. Coleman’s grandparent
visitation because she had failed to prove that Mr. Olson opposed her
visitation during the seven-month period between Ms. Olson’s death and
the filing of the petition. Ms. Coleman then filed an application with the
Supreme Court of Tennessee to review the decisions regarding the
allocation of the insurance proceeds and the petition for grandparent
visitation.
First, the Court looked at the trial court’s decision to place the
insurance proceeds in a court registry. The Court determined that a
constructive trust may be imposed under Central Bus Lines, Inc. v. Hamilton
National Bank, when an actor has obtained or holds property through
means of fraud or unconscionable conduct. 239 S.W.2d 583, 585 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1951). However, no such conduct occurred in this situation, as
Ms. Olson was acting in the best interests of her child. Furthermore,
neither party in the suit requested that a trust be established for the child.
Accordingly, the Court found that the trial court erred in ordering the
proceeds to be placed in a court registry for the child. Additionally, because
the Court found that the trust was void, the trial court also erred when
requiring Ms. Coleman to repay the expenditures to the registry from her
savings account.
The Court then addressed the Court of Appeals’ decision to award
Mr. Olson the insurance proceeds after considering the equities of the
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parties. Noting that this was an issue of first impression in the state of
Tennessee, the Court looked at TCA Section 36-4-106(d)(2) and
interpreted the statute to mean that an injunction is no longer valid when
a party to the divorce suit dies, because a death means the action has been
abated. Therefore, the Court of Appeals was correct to analogize this case
with the reasoning in Aither and allow the trial court to make equitable
considerations of the parties, because Ms. Olson violated the statutory
injunction but later had the divorce abated by her death. However, the
Court disagreed with the application of this principle, and declared that
awarding the entirety of the proceeds to Mr. Olson was not equitable. The
Court determined that there was not enough evidence brought at trial to
determine the equity of both parties and remanded the issue to the trial
court to consider additional evidence and make a determination on the
parties’ equities in order to apportion the proceeds correctly.
Next, the Court considered the denial of grandparent visitation to Ms.
Coleman. The Court looked to TCA Section 36-6-306 regarding
grandparent visitation and concluded that in order to receive courtordered visitation rights, there must be evidence that the custodial parent
opposes the grandparent having visitation rights. This evidence must be
presentable when the petition is filed, and it cannot be offered in
anticipation that opposition will likely occur in the future. Based upon the
evidence presented at trial, a mutual animosity between the parties was not
sufficient to prove that Mr. Olson opposed grandparent visitation. The
Court reasoned that this statutory interpretation, alongside the fact that
Mr. Olson remained open to cooperating with Ms. Coleman, meant that
the Court of Appeals did not err by determining that court-ordered
visitation rights should be denied. Therefore, the denial of Ms. Coleman’s
petition was upheld.
In light of this decision, transactional attorneys in Tennessee should
advise clients to change their life insurance beneficiaries before choosing
to go forth with a divorce suit. Ms. Olson was trying to protect her child,
but the Court’s decision to apply the Aither standard in these situations
means that a good faith intention to alter a beneficiary will be seen as a
violation of a statutory injunction. Therefore, it is always in a client’s best
interest to look through their policies and make necessary changes to them
prior to filing a suit that will later prevent them from doing so.
Additionally, this decision gives valuable insight into situations
involving visitation rights. Transactional attorneys in Tennessee should
advise their clients to always make a good-faith effort to establish visitation
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schedules before filing a petition in court. The judicial system wants to see
that a grandparent seeking visitation rights has made an attempt to secure
as much by communicating with the custodial guardian, and in the event
that the guardian opposes this visitation, the court will grant visitation
rights if doing so will prevent substantial harm to the child. Because
evidence is critical to a court’s determination, attorneys should advise their
clients to transcribe some form of written communication expressing a
desire to set up a visitation schedule. Anything from emails, to text
messages, to hand-written letters can be easily presented to a court in the
event that a guardian refuses to cooperate.

SECURITIES—DISSENTER’S RIGHTS
The Supreme Court of Tennessee overruled Blasingame v. Am.
Materials, Inc. , 654 S.W.2d 659 (Tenn. 1983), holding that dissenters’
rights statutes do not require the exclusive use of the Delaware
Block valuation method for determining fair value of shares; rather
trial courts have flexibility to choose the valuation that best fits the
circumstances. Athlon Sports Commc’ns, Inc. v. Duggan, 549 S.W.3d 107
(Tenn. 2018).

Jamie Thompson
In Athlon Sports Commc’ns, Inc. v. Duggan, the Supreme Court of
Tennessee addressed the methods in which trial courts may determine the
“fair value” of the shares of dissenting shareholders under Tennessee’s
dissenters’ rights statutes, codified at Tennessee Code Annotated sections
48-23-1-1, et seq. According to Tennessee law, “[a] shareholder is entitled
to dissent from and obtain payment of the fair value of the shareholder’s
shares in the event of . . . a plan of merger.” Tenn. Code. Ann. § 48-23102. Historically, Tennessee trial courts utilized the Delaware Block
method of valuation to determine the “fair value” of the shares of a
dissenting shareholder. Under this method, an appraiser determines the
value of a corporation under three valuation types: market value, asset
value, and earnings value. However, in this case, the Tennessee Supreme
Court overruled Blasingame, which implicitly articulated the exclusive use
of the Delaware Block valuation method. In overruling Blasingame, the
Court adopted Delaware’s approach used in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457
A.2d 701 (Del. 1983), where the Delaware Supreme Court rejected the
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Delaware Block as the exclusive method in appraisal proceedings and
allowed for other techniques and methods.
In March 2010, Plaintiff-Appellant Athlon Sports Communications,
Inc. (“Athlon”) hired Defendant-Appellee Stephen Duggan (“Duggan”),
a certified public accountant, to help Athlon with their financial
difficulties. Duggan proposed a plan to publish a monthly sports
publication called “Athlon Sports” in order to generate revenues through
advertising sales. Duggan also invested $1.5 million in the company and
received 15% of Athlon’s ownership shares. Additionally, Athlon hired a
CPA firm, Lattimore Black, Morgan, & Cain (“Lattimore Black”), to
conduct a valuation of Athlon, in part to establish a basis for the value of
the shares that Duggan now owned. Subsequently, Lattimore Black placed
Athlon’s enterprise value at $8.1 million. Notably, Lattimore Black’s
valuations were based in part on probability estimates of the success of
the Athlon Sports project Duggan proposed. Although successful, the
circulation of Athlon Sports did not generate the anticipated level of
advertisement revenue.
After implementation of the Athlon Sports project, Athlon experienced
a significant cash-flow deficit. In response, Duggan was permitted to
pursue outside capital to address Athlon’s cash flow issues. However, on
November 28, 2011, Athlon terminated Duggan’s employment. While
Duggan resigned as CEO of Athlon, he remained on the board of
directors. Following Duggan’s termination, an ad-hoc committee was
formed to explore options for returning Athlon to profitability.
Specifically, the Committee developed a “Plan of Merger” to form a new
corporation. The Plan of Merger provided that some Athlon shareholders
would not be invited to the new corporation, and the Committee expected
that some shareholders would dissent from the planned merger. Duggan
was one such person who was not invited to participate in ownership of
stock of the new corporation. In anticipation of some dissent, the
Committee hired Michael Collins from 2nd Generation Capital to
determine the value of the dissenting shareholders’ stock.
Ultimately, the investment firm’s valuation determined that Athlon’s
fair market value was zero. Accordingly, Mr. Collins recommended that all
shares of Athlon not yet converted into shares of the new corporation
under the Plan of Merger be canceled and that the owners be
compensated at the rate of 1 cent per share. Athlon increased this
recommendation to $.10 per share.
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The merger became effective on August 10, 2012, and Athlon was
required to compensate Duggan and the other non-participating
shareholders for the fair value of their shares. In October 2012, Duggan
was sent a fair value payment check for $.10 per share plus interest.
Duggan rejected the offer and demanded $6.18 per share. However,
Duggan’s demand was rejected.
Athlon filed a lawsuit against Duggan for judicial appraisal of “the fair
value of the shares and accrued interest” as of the date of the merger. At
trial, both parties introduced experts who testified on the fair value of
Athlon stock. Athlon’s expert, Mr. Collins, employed the Delaware Block
Method of valuation. On the other hand, Duggan’s expert employed the
Delaware Block Method and two other methods—the guideline
companies method and the discounted cash flow (DCF) method.
Ultimately, the trial court found in favor of Athlon, concluding that the
fair market value of the dissenting shareholders’ stock was “no greater
than the $.10 per share amount paid.”
On appeal, the dissenting shareholders argued that the trial court erred
in relying exclusively on the Delaware Block method for determining the
value of their Athlon Shares. The appellate court ultimately held that the
trial court correctly followed Tennessee case precedent in utilizing the
Delaware Block Method for valuation, even though Delaware no longer
adhered to a strict application of that valuation method. Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court of Tennessee granted the dissenting shareholder’s
application for permission to appeal “to address [its] holding in Blasingame
and to consider whether the Delaware Block method should be the
exclusive method for determining the fair value of stock held by dissenting
shareholders.”
At the Tennessee Supreme Court, the dissenting shareholders argued
again that the lower courts erred in holding that Blasingame required
exclusive use of the Delaware Block method to determine the fair value
of the shares. They further argued that if Blasingame did hold that the
Delaware Block method was the exclusive method for valuation, then it
should be overruled. Instead, they argued trial courts should be permitted
to allow such valuation by any generally accepted method. Because
Tennessee statutes do not address the methods of valuation, the Court
had to decide this issue without any guidance from the legislature.
The Court noted that the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in TriContinental Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71 (Del. 1950), created the valuation
method that came to be known as the Delaware Block method. The
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Tennessee Supreme Court adopted this valuation method thirty-three
years later in Blasingame. Under this method, an appraiser determines the
value of a corporation according to its market value, asset value, and
earnings value. This method was eventually overturned by Delaware in
1983 after its landmark case, Weinberger v. UOP Inc. In that case, the court
determined that the Delaware Block method was outmoded and rejected
it as the exclusive method of valuation in appraisal proceedings. While
Weinberger determined that the method was outmoded, it did not prohibit
the use of the Delaware Block method. Interestingly, during the same year
of the Weinberger decision, the Tennessee Supreme Court issued its opinion
in Blasingame. However, the Weinberger decision was not addressed in the
Blasingame opinion. While Blasingame did not explicitly mandate the use of
the Delaware Block method as the exclusive method for valuation, it was
implicit in the Court’s opinion.
The Tennessee Supreme Court determined that the state’s dissenters’
rights statutes did not require any particular valuation method for a
dissenting shareholder’s stock, and therefore, neither should the courts.
The Court favored, and decided to adopt, the Weinberger approach for two
primary reasons: (1) it gives trial courts the flexibility to choose the
valuation method to determine fair value that best fits the circumstances,
and (2) in matters of corporate law, Tennessee courts often look to
Delaware law. Furthermore, the Court recognized, “the law must change
when necessary to serve the needs of the people.” The Court noted that
Delaware courts, as well as many other jurisdictions, have recognized the
limitations of the Delaware Block method.
In sum, the Court overruled Blasingame to the extent that it implies that
trial courts should exclusively use the Delaware Block method and adopted
the more flexible approach used in Weinberger. Ultimately, because it was
unclear whether the trial court’s evaluation of the evidence was affected
by its perception that Blasingame mandated the use of the Delaware Block
method, the Court remanded for reconsideration of the valuation of the
dissenting shareholders’ shares.
Accordingly, corporations and dissenting shareholders can now utilize
other valuation methods for “fair value,” such as those that include
projections of future value, where appropriate. These projections must be
provable and not speculative in nature. Tennessee courts can now also
consider various valuation methods, including the Delaware Block
Method, though not exclusively. Appraisers can use the Delaware Block
Method in Tennessee fair value determinations where it is appropriate.
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PATENTS—INTER PARTES REVIEW
The Supreme Court of the United States held that inter partes
review of an issued patent does not violate Article III or the Seventh
Amendment of the Constitution. Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s
Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1370 (2018).

Mason Shelton
In Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, the
Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of whether the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) could reconsider and cancel
an issued patent. According to the America Invents Act, any third-party
that is not the patent owner “can request cancellation of ‘one or more
claims of a patent’ on the grounds that the claim fails the novelty or
nonobviousness standards for patentability.” 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (2012 ed.).
Ordinarily, when establishing administrative processes, Congress cannot
confer Article III power outside of the federal judiciary. Upon review,
however, the Supreme Court held that Congress can properly assign inter
partes review to the PTO without running afoul of the Constitution.
Under the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, the PTO is “responsible
for [the] granting and issuing of patents.” 35 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1) (2017 ed.).
Congress previously addressed wrongly issued patents by creating
processes for the PTO to “reconsider and cancel patent claims.” In 1980,
Congress began by establishing ex parte reexamination, which permitted
any person to “file a request for reexamination.” 35 U.S.C. § 302.
Specifically, reexamination would commence if the Director of the PTO
found a “new question of patentability.” Id. § 303(a). In 1999, Congress
added inter partes reexamination to allow the third-party challenger and the
patent owner to “participate in a limited manner by filing responses and
replies.”
Further, in 2012, the America Invents Act “replaced inter partes
reexamination with inter partes review.” Under inter partes review, after the
third-party files the inter partes review request, the Director of the PTO
determines whether “there is a reasonable likelihood that the [third-party]
would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged.” See id. §
314(a). Once the Director’s decision is made, it is “final and
nonappealable.” Id, § 314(d). Upon the Director’s approval, the Patent
Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) oversees and determines whether the
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patent is valid. Either party displeased with the PTAB’s decision may seek
judicial review. Id. § 319.
In 2001, Oil States Energy Services, LLC (“Grantee”) received a
patent “relating to an apparatus and method for protecting wellhead
equipment used in hydraulic fracturing.” Eleven years later, Grantee sued
Greene’s Energy Group, LLC (“Greene’s Energy”) in federal court for
patent infringement. Greene’s Energy responded by filing a patentability
challenge with the PTAB arguing that Grantee’s patents were invalid
because they were (1) “anticipated by prior art” and (2) not mentioned in
the original patent application. The two actions proceeded concurrently.
Following a bench trial, the District Court issued a claim-construction
order and ruled in favor of Grantee in June 2014 because prior art
foreclosed the challenged claims. Within a few months of that ruling,
however, the PTAB found Grantee’s claims unpatentable, because they
were “anticipated by prior art” and—contrary to the District Court’s
decision—revoked the patent. Grantee appealed to the Federal Circuit,
which subsequently affirmed the PTAB’s decision. Grantee appealed again
and argued that inter partes review violated both Article III and the Seventh
Amendment of the Constitution because the PTAB allegedly wielded
judicial power and the patent redetermination process precluded Grantee’s
right to a jury trial.
Ultimately, on appeal, the Supreme Court rejected Grantee’s argument
that inter partes review violated Article III. The Court noted that the Article
III consideration hinged on whether public rights or private rights were at
issue. First, the Court stated that “Congress [has] significant latitude to
assign adjudication of public rights to entities” outside of the federal
judiciary. The Court then explained that public rights concern matters
“arising between the government and others.” Because the grant of a
patent involves granting a public franchise, the Court recognized inter partes
review as falling “squarely within the public-rights doctrine.” Furthermore,
the Court stated that inter partes review “is simply a reconsideration of that
grant.”
Next, the Court explained that the timing of the process was one of
the primary distinctions between inter partes review and the initial grant of
a patent. This distinction, however, made little difference for the Court,
because the PTO granted patents subject to the qualification that they may
be reexamined or cancelled in an inter partes review. The Court found the
reexamination qualification to be consistent with Congress’s Article I
power to issue patents because Congress authorized the Executive Branch
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to grant patents and, thus, review its own decisions of patentability.
Therefore, patents “remain . . . outside of an Article III court” and may
be adjudicated before an executive board. In making its determination, the
Court pointed to past cases where Congress had granted a franchise but
reserved its authority to revoke. See, e.g., Louisville Bridge Co. v. United States,
242 U.S. 409, 421 (1917).
The Court also rejected Grantee’s argument that its patent rights
should be recognized as private property. The Court explained that patents
only entitle protection as far as the relevant statute prescribes.
Furthermore, the Court focused on the fact that the Patent Act “qualifies
any property rights . . . subjecting them to the express provision,”
including inter partes review.
In addition, the Supreme Court also rejected Grantee’s argument that
inter partes review violates the principle that Congress may not prevent
judicial review of any matter that is subject to a suit under common law,
equity, or admiralty. The Court pointed to the 18th-Century Privy Council
in England as a “prominent feature of the English system . . . [that had]
concurrent jurisdiction with the courts.” Because the Patent Clause of the
Constitution “‘was written against the backdrop’ of the English system,”
the Court concluded that, from the founding, patents were understood to
be subject to cancellation by an executive body similar to the Privy
Council. See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966).
Moreover, the Court rejected Grantee’s argument that inter partes
review violated Article III, because the PTAB shared too many similarities
with a court. Grantee argued that characteristics like “motion practice . . .
discovery, depositions, and cross-examination of witnesses; introduction
of evidence and objections based on the Federal Rules of Evidence”
proved that the PTAB exercised judicial power that is only reserved for a
court. The Court, however, dismissed this argument because the Grantee
attempted to utilize a test that the Court had never previously adopted—
specifically, a “looks like” test. The Court explained that “[t]he fact that an
agency uses court-like procedures does not necessarily mean it is exercising
judicial power . . . [n]or does the fact that an administrative adjudication is
final and binding . . . make it an exercise of the judicial power.” The Court
identified the Treasury Department’s “final and binding audits” as support
for “adversarial litigation” in tribunal proceedings. Furthermore, the Court
concluded that inter partes review did not make the necessary “binding
determination regarding ‘liability’ under the law.” Indeed, the fact that the
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PTAB would not be making a determination of whether Greene’s Energy
had liability to Grantee became the key distinction for the Court.
Finally, the Supreme Court summarily dismissed Grantee’s argument
that inter partes review violated the Seventh Amendment’s right to a jury
trial in civil cases. Notably, the Court stated that the Seventh Amendment
is not at issue “when Congress properly assigns a matter to adjudication
in a non-Article III tribunal.” Thus, the Court’s rejection of Grantee’s
Article III argument also “resolves its Seventh Amendment challenge.”
In a concurring opinion, Justice Breyer agreed that inter partes review
sufficiently involved public rights “to show that it violate[d] neither Article
III nor the Seventh Amendment.” He cautioned, however, that
circumstances may arise where private rights could be “adjudicated other
than by Article III courts,” such as executive agencies. Justice Breyer closed
his opinion by noting that “[t]he presence of ‘private rights’ does not
automatically determine the outcome of the question.” Thus, he indicated
that future inquiries could examine relevant factors when adjudicating
private rights.
In his dissent, Justice Gorsuch took exception that “a political
appointee . . . instead of an independent judge, [could] resolve the
dispute.” Further, he identified concerns that dated as far back as to the
Nation’s founding about the influence that unaccountable powerful
interests and political actors could have on a court’s decision. Specifically,
Justice Gorsuch compared the present-day administrative arbiters to the
“colonial judges” that the founders cited in the Declaration of
Independence. In closing, he posited that the majority signaled “a retreat
from Article III’s guarantees . . . in the name of efficient government.”
Ultimately, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and the
decision of the PTAB, thereby invalidating the Grantee’s patent.
Importantly, the Court stressed the “narrowness” of its ruling by saying it
only addressed inter partes review. In fact, the Court noted that nothing in
its holding considered whether patents are “property for purposes of the
Due Process Clause or the Takings Clause.”
The Court’s holding, however narrow, does affect Tennessee patent
practitioners. Specifically, the holding indicates that administrative
adjudication will remain a viable option for opponents of a particular
patent claim. Innovators and inventors should take note that even after the
initial patent grant, the PTO reserves its authority to revoke the patent
upon reexamination. Although these proceedings may seemingly mimic a
trial court, the administrative agency will have the congressionally
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approved latitude to correct errors in the patent granting process.
Practicing transactional attorneys must take note of this process and make
efforts to ensure that their patent applications can withstand
reexamination and review from the PTAB. Without Congress rewriting
the legislation, the Supreme Court has given inter partes review its stamp of
approval. The Court’s narrow holding does, however, leave unanswered
the question concerning whether or not “retroactive application of inter
partes review” is constitutional.

LIQUOR LICENSING LAWS
The Sixth Circuit held that Tennessee Code Annotated Section 573-204(b)(2)(A), (3)(A)–(B), and (3)(D) violated the dormant
Commerce Clause and, therefore, severed the provisions from the
statute. However, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to address
this issue. Byrd v. Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n, 883 F.3d 608 (6th
Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 52 (2018).

Morgan Kain
In Byrd v. Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n, the Sixth Circuit addressed
whether the provisions found within Tennessee Code Annotated (“TCA”)
Section 57-3-204(b) violated the Dormant Commerce Clause by
considering whether the provisions were discriminatory and whether the
purpose of the statute could be satisfied through a nondiscriminatory
method. The Executive Director of the Tennessee Alcoholic Beverage
Commission (“TABC”), along with Tennessee Fine Wines and Spirits,
LLC, d/b/a Total Wine Spirits Beer & More (“Fine Wine”) and Affluere
Investments, Inc., d/b/a Kimbrough Fine Wine & Spirits (“Affluere”)
filed suit against the Tennessee Wine & Spirits Retailers Association (“The
Association”) to determine the constitutionality of the statute’s provisions.
In assessing whether the provisions were constitutional, the Court looked
to the Twenty-first Amendment and the Constitution’s Commerce Clause.
After review, the Sixth Circuit determined that the Tennessee statutory
provisions violated the Commerce Clause. Because these violations made
the provisions unconstitutional, the Court ultimately severed the
provisions from the statute.
Under the current statute, Tennessee requires that licenses for alcohol
distribution be allocated to three levels of distribution—manufactures and
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distillers, wholesalers, and liquor retailers—known as the “three-tier
system.” The TABC distributes the licenses to various entities and
individuals. Prior to this decision, for an individual to receive a license,
TCA Section 57-3-204(b)(2)(A) required that the individual be “a bona
fide resident of [Tennessee] during the two-year period immediately
preceding the date upon which application is made to the commission.”
Additionally, to renew a license, the individual must remain a resident of
Tennessee for at least ten years. Id.
When assessing corporations, the TABC would not grant a
corporation a license “if any officer, director, or stockholder owning any
capital stock in the corporation, would be ineligible to receive a retailer’s
license for any reason specified in subdivision (b)(2)” and “all of [a
corporation’s] capital stock must be owned by individuals who are
residents of [Tennessee] and [] have been residents of the state for the two
(2) years immediately preceding the date application is made to the
commission.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 57-3-204(b)(2)(A) (2018). For renewal
of the license, the owners of stock must have “at any time been a resident
of [Tennessee] for at least ten (10) consecutive years.” Id. § 57-3204(b)(3)(B).
Fine Wine and Affluere did not comply with the requirements for
residency needed within Tenn. Code Ann. Section 57-3-204 because both
principal addresses were not located within Tennessee, and the members
of Fine Wine did not reside in Tennessee. Due to these statutory
deficiencies, the TABC decided to withhold voting on Fine Wine and
Affluere’s license applications. Because both Fine Wine and Affluere’s
applications were pending, the Association—who represents business
owners within Tennessee and is the defendant in this manner—discussed
the possibility of litigation with the TABC. Following these discussions,
Tennessee’s Attorney General entered suit on behalf of Clayton Byrd, the
Executive Director of the TABC, to determine if the durational-residency
requirements found within the Tennessee statute were constitutional.
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee
held that the durational residency requirements were unconstitutional by
examining the language found within the statute. Following that decision,
the Sixth Circuit reviewed the judgment of the district court de novo. To
determine whether the Tennessee statutory provisions were
unconstitutional, the court looked to the Twenty-first Amendment and the
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.

2019]

CASE COMMENTARIES

193

Specifically, section two of the Twenty-first Amendment prohibits
“the transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession
of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in
violation of the laws thereof.” U.S. Const. amend XXI, § 2. Therefore, the
Twenty-first Amendment allows states to regulate alcohol distribution
within the state and its surrounding borders. Alternatively, the Commerce
Clause allows for Congress to “regulate Commerce . . . among the several
States.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. However, the Court noted that the
Commerce Clause “cannot impede Congress’s power by ‘unjustifiably . . .
discriminat[ing] against or burden[ing] the interstate flow of articles of
commerce.’” Essentially, the Court held that the Dormant Commerce
Clause precludes “a state protecting in-state economic interests by
burdening out-of-state economic interests.” Id.
In its evaluation of the case, the Sixth Circuit considered two previous
cases concerning the constitutionality of laws surrounding the Twentyfirst Amendment and the Commerce Clause. The Court considered the
finding in Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, which held a law to be unconstitutional
because the law “violate[d] a central tenant of the Commerce Clause but
is not supported by any clear concern of the Twenty-first Amendment.”
468 U.S. 263, 276 (1984). Additionally, the Court considered Granholm v.
Heald, which stated “[w]hen a state statute directly regulates or
discriminates against interstate commerce, or when its effect is to favor instate economic interests over out-of-state interests, [the Supreme Court
has] generally struck down the statute without further inquiry.” 544 U.S.
460, 487 (2005). The Court used these cases as guidance to determine how
the Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause interacted with
the targeted Tennessee statutory provisions.
First, the Sixth Circuit found that the durational-residency
requirements within the Tennessee statutory provisions governed the
individuals and corporations who try to interact within the economic
environment rather than governing the stream of alcoholic beverages
throughout Tennessee. The Court reasoned that the statute’s provisions
focused on who can sell alcohol as opposed to the distribution of alcohol
itself. Therefore, the Sixth Circuit determined that the “Twenty-first
Amendment does not immunize[] Tennessee’s durational-residency
requirements from scrutiny under the [D]ormant Commerce Clause.”
Next, the Sixth Circuit considered whether the provisions violated the
Commerce Clause. To determine whether a violation occurred, the Sixth
Circuit, turned to its decision in Cherry Hill Vineyards, LLC v. Lilly, 553 F.3d
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423 (6th Cir. 2008), to determine whether the statutory provisions were
discriminatory against out-of-state economic interactions, and, if the
provisions were deemed discriminatory, the statute could achieve its goal
through other nondiscriminatory manners. The Sixth Circuit found that
the requirements for residency negatively impacted out-of-state residents
by inhibiting their ability to obtain licenses and beneficially impacted instate residents by protecting them from out-of-state business entering into
the state. Therefore, the provisions were, in fact, discriminatory.
Because the Court found the provisions to be discriminatory, the Sixth
Circuit then looked to determine whether the statute could meet its goal
through another method after excluding the provisions. The Court
identified that the goals of the residency requirements as: (1) “protecting
‘the health, safety, and welfare’ of Tennessee’s citizens” and (2) “using a
higher level of oversight and control over liquor retailers.” Neither side
presented the court with a nondiscriminatory method. Therefore, because
the statute also included other provisions that did not relate to the
requirements surrounding residency, the Sixth Circuit severed only the
offending provisions. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 57-3-204(b)(2)(A), (3)(A),
(3)(B), (3)(D).
In addition to the majority decision, Judge Sutton concurred by
agreeing that the full residency requirement for stockholders and the tenyear residency requirement for renewal were unconstitutional; however, he
also dissented and opined that the two-year residency requirement did not
violate the Constitution. Judge Sutton noted the precedent set by Granholm
v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 488 (2005) by stating that “[t]he States retain
‘virtually complete control’ over ‘how to structure the[ir] liquor
distribution system[s].’” States, therefore, should be allowed the
opportunity to monitor the distribution how they please. The judge
indicated that the three-tier method found within Tennessee’s alcohol
distribution system must be considered valid, and therefore, the State has
the power to control that “retailers and wholesalers to reside within [its]
borders,” and the two-year provision is an appropriate means for
Tennessee to do so.
Moreover, after the Sixth Circuit’s decision, the Association appealed
to the Supreme Court of the United States, and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari on September 27, 2018 and held oral arguments on
January 16, 2019. See Byrd v. Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n,, 139 S. Ct.
52 (2018).
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On June 26, 2019, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed
the Sixth Circuit’s decision and found the provisions to be
unconstitutional. Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S.Ct.
2449 (2019). Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court. The Court
noted that the Sixth Circuit “struck down the provisions [concerning the
ten-year resident requirement for renewal and the resident requirement for
corporation stockholders] as blatant violations of the Commerce Clause .
. .” and “invalidated a provision requiring applicants for an initial license
to have resided in the State for the prior two years.” Thomas, 139 S. Ct.
2449, 2457. Expanding upon the Sixth Circuit’s ruling, the Court not only
found the provisions to be unconstitutional but also elaborated further
upon the two-year residency requirement for an initial license by stating
the provision “violates the Commerce Clause and is not shielded by §2 of
the Twenty-First Amendment.” Id.
Throughout their analysis, the Court examined the Dormant
Commerce Clause and the Twenty-first Amendment, specifically §2,
alongside Tennessee’s residencies provisions demonstrating how the
provisions are, in fact, unconstitutional. Id. at 2459. The Court began by
illustrating the history of the Dormant Commerce Clause. Id. at 2459–60.
Through its examination of the Commerce Clause, the Court established
that the clause “by its own force restricts state protectionism . . . ,” and
because of this purpose, the two-year requirement found within the code
could not be upheld since it “plainly favors Tennesseans over nonresidents
. . . “ enforcing exactly what the clause aimed to preclude. Id. at 2460, 2462.
One key distinction made by the Court included the fact that the Court
was not examining or undercutting the three-tier distribution system
established by Tennessee, but rather, the Court was solely focused on the
residency requirements that must have been satisfied to obtain a license.
Id. at 2471.
After examining the Dormant Commerce Clause, the Court turned to
the Twenty-first Amendment which the Association primarily relied upon
during its argument. Id. at 2462. The Court regarded the plain language of
the provision while also considering the interpretation that has been
established throughout the Court’s history and case law. Id. The
interpretation that the Court applied states that §2 “was adopted to give
each State the authority to address alcohol-related public health and safety
issues in accordance with the preferences of its citizens. . . .” Id. at 2474.
The Court emphasized that §2 cannot be read independently but must be
read alongside the rest of the constitutional principles. Id. at 2462, 2468.
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Moreover, the Court found that the residency requirements could not be
covered under §2 of the Twenty-first Amendment because the record
established no proof that the requirements really do “promote public
health and safety,” and there was no proof that nondiscriminatory means
would be insufficient to promote said interests. Id. at 2475. Therefore, the
Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit’s decision finding the provisions
unconstitutional and severed. Id. at 2476.
Following the majority’s opinion, Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice
Thomas, dissented and contended that “[s]tates may impose residency
requirements on those who seek to sell alcohol within their borders to
ensure that retailers comply with local laws and norms.” Id. at 2477. In
reaching this conclusion, Justice Gorsuch noted that throughout history—
in fact close to over a span of 150 years—states have utilized residency
requirements to control alcohol distribution throughout their own states.
Id. Justice Gorsuch specified that residency requirements began appearing
within state laws as early as 1834 and have continued to exist since. Id. at
2478. Additionally, he described a tug of war of sorts between the Court
and Congress in regards to these state laws and their interaction with the
Dormant Commerce Clause. Id. at 2478–79. Ultimately, while the majority
found that these provisions could not be deemed constitutional, the
dissenting justices stood firm that history and precedent set forth a
standard that states should be given the freedom to monitor alcohol sales
within their own borders. Id. at 2477.
In light of the Court’s recent decision, attorneys should be aware that
provisions severed by the Sixth Circuit still remain, and will continue to
remain, severed. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 57-3-204(b)(2)(A), (3)(A), (3)(B),
(3)(D). Attorneys and those seeking to gain liquor licenses no longer have
to abide by the residency requirements set forth in the Tennessee statute.
Instead, they must satisfy the rest of the statutory provisions without
taking into account how long the applicant has lived within the state of
Tennessee or how many stockholders reside within the state.

2019]

CASE COMMENTARIES

197

WILLS & TRUSTS
The Tennessee Court of Appeals held that the nomination of a
person as executor was a sufficient benefit to trigger a presumption
of undue influence over a decedent’s Last Will and Testament. In re
Estate of Land, No. E2017-01429-COA-R3-CV, 2018 WL 3854042, 2018
Tenn. App. LEXIS 466 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 2018).

Patrick Hogan
In In re Estate of Land, the Court of Appeals addressed whether the
naming of a person as executor is a sufficient benefit to trigger a
presumption of undue influence over a decedent’s Last Will and
Testament. Judy Allen (“Allen”) filed suit contesting the Last Will and
Testament of Ida Land (the “Decedent”) dated May 9, 2011 and later
admitted to probate in October of 2015. At trial, the jury found that a
presumption of undue influence arose from the confidential relationship
between Kenneth Hill (“Hill”) and his wife, Pauline Hill, and the
Decedent.
The Decedent died in August of 2015 with no surviving spouse or
children. Hill’s wife was the sister of the Decedent’s second husband,
Charles Land, who was also deceased. According to the record, Land and
the Decedent were married in 1986 or 1987. Allen was the maternal niece
of Decedent and had a lifelong relationship with her. In 2009, Decedent
fell and broke her pelvis, prompting Allen to begin providing care for her.
Following Allen’s retirement in 2010, the Decedent asked her to provide
care for her for the remainder of Decedent’s life. Allen then took over
preparing meals, administering medications, and other basic functions of
care on a daily basis. Further in 2010, Decedent asked Allen to take her to
see an attorney, wishing to prepare a will that her then-alive husband would
not have knowledge of.
Although Decedent had a shared checking account with her husband
Charles Land, she kept a separate savings account without his knowledge.
Decedent had Allen’s name put on this savings account so Allen could
further help manage her care. At this time, the account held approximately
$30,000 and the balance remained approximately the same until Allen was
ousted from control of the account. Additionally, Allen testified that
Decedent was in good health overall but was diagnosed with dementia in
April of 2011.
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In April of 2011, Charles Land discovered the secret account.
Tensions quickly began to rise, coming to a head on May 5, 2011. On that
day, an altercation occurred that led Charles Land’s side of the family to
call the police on Allen, her husband, and her father while they were at the
Decedent’s home. While no arrests were made, Charles Land’s family,
including Hill and his wife, soon cut Allen off from any contact with
Decedent. Before this event, Allen had been Decedent’s attorney-in-fact,
but on May 12, 2011, she received cancellation of the power of attorney
from the Hills’ lawyer. Pauline Hill was then appointed Decedent’s
attorney-in-fact and gained control over the savings account.
The record reflected that when Mrs. Hill took over control of the
account, its balance was reduced from $32,000 to $7,000. Moreover, the
record further showed that Mrs. Hill made loans to family members
unrelated to Decedent from this account. Ultimately, on May 9, 2011, a
new will was made for Decedent, and Decedent was placed in a nursing
home.
Following the death of Decedent, Allen filed suit contesting the new
will. After trial, the jury returned a verdict stating that Allen proved by a
preponderance of the evidence that there was undue influence arising
from the confidential relationship between the Hills and the Decedent.
The jury also found that Allen proved that Kenneth Hill and Pauline Hill
unduly profited from the will of the Decedent and that they did not prove
by clear and convincing evidence that the transaction was fair. Kenneth
Hill then appealed to the Tennessee Court of Appeals.
According to the Tennessee Supreme Court, a party may challenge a
will when the executor subjects the decedent to undue influence.
Specifically, a presumption of undue influence arises when a confidential
relationship is established that is then followed by a transaction benefitting
the dominant party. Matlock v. Simpson, 902 S.W.2d 384, 386 (Tenn. 1995).
The Court held that confidential relationship is defined as any relationship
that gives one person dominion and control over another. Notably, the
Court held that a presumption of undue influence can only be rebutted
by clear and convincing evidence of the fairness of the transaction. Id.
The burden of proof concerning the confidential relationship first
rests on the party claiming its existence. Brown v. Welk, 725 S.W.2d 938, 945
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1983). Once shown, a confidential relationship gives rise
to a presumption of undue influence. Matlock, 902 S.W.2d at 386. The
Court held that the burden then rests with the dominant party to rebut the
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presumption by proving the transaction was fair with clear and convincing
evidence. Id.
However, a confidential relationship alone is insufficient to give rise to
the presumption of undue influence. This is so because it is not the
relationship itself that concerns the courts but the abuse of such a
relationship. In re Estate of Maddox, 60 S.W.3d 84, 89 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).
Thus, proof of the existence of a confidential relationship must be
supplemented with evidence of other suspicious circumstances. Id. A
party “must prove the existence of suspicious circumstances warranting
the conclusion that the person allegedly influenced did not act freely and
independently.” Id. at 88. The Maddox court listed three suspicious
circumstances that are frequently paired with a confidential relationship
that give rise to a presumption of undue influence: (1) the confidential
relationship itself; (2) the decedent’s physical and mental deterioration; and
(3) the beneficiary’s active involvement in procuring the will. Id. at 89.
Supplementing these factors, the Court listed eight other commonlyrecognized suspicious circumstances surrounding a confidential
relationship such as: (1) secrecy concerning the will’s existence; (2) the
testator’s advanced age; (3) the lack of independent advice in preparing
the will; (4) the testator’s illiteracy or blindness; or, (5) the unjust or
unnatural nature of the will’s terms. The Court explained that the list,
however, was non-exhaustive.
The Court held a that confidential relationship existed between Hill
and his wife and the Decedent due to their roles as executor of the estate
and attorney-in-fact, respectively. The issue raised by Hill on appeal
concerned whether being named executor was too uncertain to constitute
a benefit, as it was dependent on whether there were sufficient funds in
the estate to properly pay for services provided by the executor. Further,
Hill argued that the benefit was too uncertain because the testator could
revoke the nomination, and the nominated executor could predecease the
testator. In rejecting Hill’s arguments, the Court reasoned that this
argument could also be made for a beneficiary of the will; thus, “being
named as an executor is no more uncertain a benefit than being named as
a beneficiary in the will.”
Hill then argued that to prove undue influence, Allen had to show that
the benefit derived to him was “direct and pecuniary.” The Court instead
held that the benefit only need be “to the advantage of the dominant
party” and does not need to be accrued directly. Importantly, in addition
to being named executor, Hill’s nieces and nephews were the beneficiaries

200

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 21

of the Decedent’s estate. As such, Hill was indirectly benefitting from the
will. The Court’s decision was also influenced by the realization that if a
party could escape a presumption of undue influence by having benefits
conferred on close family members, then a loophole would be created that
would encourage the use of undue influence.
Accordingly, the Court held that the nomination of someone as the
executor of an estate was a sufficient benefit to prompt a presumption of
undue influence. In doing so, the Court upheld the jury verdict in favor of
Allen in the will contest.
In light of this decision, transactional attorneys in Tennessee should
be aware of the closing of an apparent loophole in wills. Specifically, the
executor of an estate does not have to benefit directly in order for the
courts to find a benefit derived. As long as the benefit is “to the advantage”
of a dominant party in a confidential relationship, then it is easier to
prompt a presumption of undue influence and challenge the will. This
decision means attorneys in Tennessee should be careful when a party
looks to gain benefits from a will for third-parties unrelated to the
decedent. Going forward, this holding will make it easier to challenge a
will, especially when a confidential relationship can be found, as the
parameters of what a benefit is has been expanded.

BANKRUPTCY—POWERS OF BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEE
The Supreme Court of the United States held that for the purposes
of the safe-harbor provision under 11 U.S.C. § 546(e), the relevant
transfer is the overarching transfer. Merit Mgt. Grp., LP v. FTI Consulting,
Inc., 138 S. Ct. 883 (2018).

Trevor Torres
In Merit Management Grp., LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., the Supreme Court
addressed whether the U.S.C.’s Section 546(e)’s securities safe-harbor
provision bars avoidance of overarching transfers (e.g., A  D), or its
component parts of a transfer (e.g., A  B  C  D). Specifically,
Sections 544 through 553 detail circumstances under which a trustee may
avoid completing a transaction, known as “avoiding powers.” Section 548
was relevant to this case, which provides that a trustee may avoid
constructively fraudulent transfers if the debtor was insolvent on the date
that the transfer or obligation was made or incurred, or if the debtor
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became insolvent as a result of the transfer or obligation. 11 U.S.C. §
548(a)(1)(B).
However, there are limits placed on the trustee’s power to pursue an
avoidance action under certain circumstances. The relevant language
states:
Notwithstanding Sections 544, 545, 547, 548(a)(1)(B), and
548(b) of this title, the trustee may not avoid a transfer that is a
. . . settlement payment . . . made by or to (or for the benefit of)
a . . . financial institution . . . or that is a transfer made by or to
(or for the benefit of) a . . . financial institution . . . in connection
with a securities contract . . . , except under Section 548(a)(1)(A)
of this title.

11 U.S.C.S. § 546(e). As such, the Supreme Court held that Section 546(e)
indicated that the only relevant transfer under the safe-harbor provision is
the overarching transfer, which the trustee in this case sought to avoid.
The intermediate transfers, which may include financial institutions or
other covered entities, are irrelevant for the purpose of determining if a
transaction is protected by the avoiding powers.
In 2003, Valley View Downs, LP (“Valley View”) and Bedford Downs
Management (“Bedford Downs”) were competing for a license to operate
a harness racing track. Both parties had intentions of opening a
“racino”— a horse racing facility with slot machines. The Pennsylvania
State Harness Racing Commission grants a limited number of licenses to
applicants for operation of these venues. With only one license remaining,
the Commission denied both applicants in 2005. After obtaining
permission to reapply, Valley View and Bedford Downs entered into an
agreement making Valley View the sole applicant. In exchange, Valley
View agreed to purchase all of Bedford Downs’ stock for $55 million
upon obtaining the license. After procuring the final license, Valley View
arranged for Credit Suisse to finance the purchase price. Credit Suisse
wired $55 million to Citizens Bank, which agreed to serve as a third-party
escrow agent. Bedford Downs’ shareholders, including Merit Management
Group, LP (“Merit”), then deposited their stock certificates into escrow.
From October 2007 to October 2010, Citizens Bank disbursed $16.5
million to Merit for the stock. Shortly after, however, Valley View learned
they would be unable to open their racino due to difficulties in obtaining
a gaming license. As a result, Valley View and its parent company filed for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Court confirmed a
reorganization plan and FTI Consulting, Inc. (“FTI”) was appointed to
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serve as the trustee. FTI filed suit against Merit to avoid the $16.5 million
transfer, arguing that the deal was constructively fraudulent because Valley
View was insolvent at the time of the purchase. Merit then moved for a
judgment on the pleadings, claiming that Section 546(e) barred avoidance.
They alleged that the safe-harbor provision applied because the transfer
was a settlement payment between two financial institutions—Credit
Suisse and Citizens Bank.
The District Court granted the motion, holding that the safe-harbor
applied because financial institutions transferred or received funds in
relation to a settlement payment or securities contract. Subsequently, the
Seventh Circuit reversed that decision, stating that Section 546(e) did not
apply to transfers in which financial institutions were only conduits or
“middle men.” The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
whether the transfer between Valley View and Merit was “made by or to
(or for the benefit of) a financial institution.”
The Court first needed to identify which transfer was relevant. Merit
pled that the Section 546(e) safe-harbor provision was applicable to the
intermediate transactions involving Credit Suisse and Citizens Bank. FTI,
however, claimed that the only relevant transfer is the main, overarching
transfer of $16.5 million from Valley View to Merit. Because that
overarching transfer was not made by, to, or for the benefit of a financial
institution, FTI argued, it would not fall under the scope of Section 546(e).
The Supreme Court agreed with FTI, holding that the overarching transfer
is the only one of relevance; therefore, the transfer in question was not
subject to the safe-harbor provision.
First, the Court analyzed the language and context of Section 546(e).
The Court reasoned that by beginning with “notwithstanding,” the Code
indicates that the safe-harbor provision is an exception to typical avoiding
powers. Accordingly, Section 546(e) is concerned only with transactions
seeking avoidance under those powers. Furthermore, the Court found that
the last clause of Section 546(e) indicated the transfer of concern is the
one the trustee sought to avoid. This Section is an “exception to the
exception” of avoiding transactions, meaning that a trustee may not avoid
a transfer that falls under the safe-harbor unless it is actually fraudulent.
The Court opined that the Code’s language was referencing a specific
transfer named by the trustee. Here, FTI was concerned with the ValleyView-to-Merit transfer, not the ones in between. This transfer did not
include Credit Suisse or Citizens Bank, which established that a transaction
had not been made by to or for the benefit of a financial institution.
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In addition to the language of this Section, the Court also examined
the Section headings involving the powers of avoidance. Notably, in
Section 546(e), the language “Limitations on Avoiding Powers” is used,
tying it to Sections 544 through 553, which describe the avoiding powers
of a trustee. The Court found these headings to be particularly instructive
because each of these Sections include language about what “the trustee
may avoid”—in comparison to the safe-harbor provision describing what
“the trustee may not avoid.” According to the statute, the transfer that
“the trustee may not avoid” is specified to be a transfer that is either a
settlement payment or made in connection with a securities contract.
Importantly, it does not include a transaction that merely involves a
settlement payment or securities contract, which led the Court to conclude
that the transfer of importance was the one the trustee sought to avoid—
not the intermediary ones.
Although the Court determined that the safe-harbor provision must
be applied to the transfer the trustee sought to avoid, the trustee was not
permitted to freely define that transfer. In fact, the transfer was defined by
the Code. Merit was then allowed to argue that FTI failed to demonstrate
an avoidable transfer. However, if FTI could show that the transfer was
avoidable, the Court would not need to analyze the pieces of the transfer.
Merit’s argument focused on the idea that FTI could not merely ignore the
use of Credit Suisse and Citizens Bank. Without any rebuttal about the
appropriate transfer for scrutiny, Merit’s concern about ignoring the
conduits was irrelevant, and the overarching transfer was the only one of
importance.
Further, Merit argued that the 2006 addition of “or for the benefit of ”
to the requirement that a transfer be “made by or to” a protected entity
was done to repeal a previous decision by the Eleventh Circuit. That court
held that the Section 546(e) safe-harbor provision did not apply to
transfers when a financial institution was only an intermediary. Merit
contended that by adding “or” to the statute, it became unnecessary for
the financial institution to have a beneficial interest when applying the
safe-harbor provision. However, the Supreme Court explained that the
language was added to match the language of the avoidance provisions.
Simply put, the addition of “or for the benefit of ” ensured that the scope
of the safe-harbor provision matched the scope of the avoiding powers.
Merit then referenced the inclusion of securities clearing agencies
under Section 546(e) in an attempt to argue that the safe-harbor provision
needed to be read to protect intermediaries without reference to their
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beneficial interest. This argument was raised because a clearing agency
primarily lives in the grounds of intermediate transactions—rather than
being the initial instigator or final recipient. In rebuttal, the Court first
recognized that Merit’s description of the role of clearing agencies was
disputable because despite their intermediary role in a transaction, they
may have a significant beneficial interest. This Court then explained that
the real question was whether the transfer was made by, to, or for the
benefit of a covered entity—including a securities clearing agency. If the
transfer seeking avoidance was made by, to, or for the benefit of a
securities clearing agency, then avoidance must be barred. Here, the
transfer the trustee sought to avoid (Valley View to Merit) did not involve
securities clearing agencies and thus could not be avoided.
Finally, Merit argued that Section 546(e) used broad, encompassing
language and should not be used as an absolute measure. Merit claimed
that the Section is framed in a way to allow courts to advance the parties’
interests. However, the Court opposed this position, stating that the safeharbor provision did not mention anything about transfers “through” a
covered entity, but instead referenced the beginning and ending point of
the transaction with “made by” and “to the benefit of ” covered entities.
Here, the transfer was “made by” Valley View “to” Merit “through” Credit
Suisse and Citizens Bank. Accordingly, because the Supreme Court found
that the relevant transfer under Section 546(e) was the overarching
transfer, the Seventh Circuit’s decision prohibiting the trustee from
applying the safe-harbor provision to avoid the transfer was affirmed.
In light of this decision, attorneys should be mindful when using a
financial institution or covered entity to complete a transaction, regardless
of what end of the transfer they are on. If their client falls under the
definition of a financial institution or covered entity, they need to
determine which part of the transaction the client is involved. If they are
one of the parties that the transfer is “made by, to or for the benefit of,”
they will not be able to utilize an avoiding power unless it is actually
fraudulent under § 548(a)(1)(A).

